Robustness of 3D Deep Learning in an Adversarial Setting by Wicker, Matthew & Kwiatkowska, Marta
Robustness of 3D Deep Learning in an Adversarial Setting
Matthew Wicker
University of Oxford
matthew.wicker@cs.ox.ac.uk
Marta Kwiatkowska
University of Oxford
marta.kwiatkowska@cs.ox.ac.uk
Abstract
Understanding the spatial arrangement and nature of
real-world objects is of paramount importance to many
complex engineering tasks, including autonomous naviga-
tion. Deep learning has revolutionized state-of-the-art per-
formance for tasks in 3D environments; however, relatively
little is known about the robustness of these approaches in
an adversarial setting. The lack of comprehensive analysis
makes it difficult to justify deployment of 3D deep learning
models in real-world, safety-critical applications. In this
work, we develop an algorithm for analysis of pointwise ro-
bustness of neural networks that operate on 3D data. We
show that current approaches presented for understanding
the resilience of state-of-the-art models vastly overestimate
their robustness. We then use our algorithm to evaluate
an array of state-of-the-art models in order to demonstrate
their vulnerability to occlusion attacks. We show that, in
the worst case, these networks can be reduced to 0% classi-
fication accuracy after the occlusion of at most 6.5% of the
occupied input space.
1. Introduction
Over the past several years, the machine learning com-
munity has worked to adapt the success of deep 2D vi-
sion algorithms to the 3D setting. Though initially slow
to reach the performance level of its 2D counterpart, recent
advances have increased the accuracy of 3D deep learning
pipelines by around 18% on the ModelNet10 and Model-
Net40 benchmarks [30]. Now that 3D deep learning al-
gorithms are able to achieve remarkable performance on
standard benchmarks (currently topping out at 95% accu-
racy), there have been many encouraging attempts to adapt
these models to real-time, safety-critical scenarios such as
landing zone detection for airborne drones [15] and ob-
ject recognition and classification for autonomous vehicles
[20, 31, 3]. In spite of the recent developments, the robust-
ness of these pipelines remains poorly understood.
The rapidly growing literature on the robustness (or lack
thereof) of 2D vision algorithms casts doubt on the stabil-
Figure 1: Despite the fact that PointNet [21] is able to
achieve high accuracy on the ModelNet40 test set, we show
that by exploiting the low cardinality of the induced criti-
cal point set we can cause the network to misclassify a man
wearing a winter coat and beanie as a plant after only 32 out
of 2048 points have been removed from the point cloud.
ity of their 3D relatives. In this work, we demonstrate the
lack of robustness of 3D deep learning to adversarial occlu-
sion, despite the results of random input occlusion suggest-
ing that they are relatively invariant to perturbation. De-
veloping comprehensive testing methods for these systems
is of paramount importance given that misclassification of
pedestrians (which is demonstrated in Figure 1) as plants
can induce poor planning by autonomous vehicles, an issue
highlighted by a fatality in the real world [9].
In the past few years, many methods for crafting adver-
sarial examples have emerged [25, 13, 19, 28], including
several frameworks for verification of safety [12, 11]. In
contrast to studies of weaknesses in deep learning models
for image recognition due to their susceptibility to adversar-
ial examples, very little work has been done to understand
the robustness of 3D deep learning pipelines. This is in
part because the data representation schemes utilized by 3D
deep learning algorithms are not amenable to many current
robustness analysis tools (see discussion in Section 2.2).
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Figure 2: We outline a high-level unification of state-of-the-art 3D deep learning pipelines. (a) Figure from [21] that demon-
strates the PointNet architecture. (b) Figure from [10] that demonstrates the architecture of a specific volumetric network.
(c) Representations of salience pulled from point cloud and volumetric networks that are then used to generate (d) minimal
adversarial manipulations.
By unifying the structure of foundational 3D deep learning
pipelines, we solve this problem and lay the groundwork for
future methods of safety testing and verification for these
systems.
The value of understanding the robustness of 3D deep
learning pipelines not only stems from their potential use
in safety-critical systems (such as self-driving cars) but also
the very noisy and unpredictable nature of collecting 3D
data. Rarely will models receive full information about an
object they are trying to recognize; rather, they will receive
a single-angle, partially-occluded view of an object. In this
work, we formalize a framework for moving towards an un-
derstanding of the performance of a wide spectrum of 3D
deep learning algorithms. The efficient algorithm we pro-
pose could easily be used to further understand and improve
the robustness and performance of future 3D deep learning
algorithms. To this end, we offer several novel contributions
to the study of 3D deep learning:
• We present a unified view of volumetric and order-
invariant 3D deep learning pipelines to exploit sensi-
tivities to small changes in their inputs.
• We develop a novel algorithm to craft adversarial ex-
amples and provide guarantees about quality and exis-
tence of misclassifications.
• We use our algorithm to give a systematic occlusion
analysis of the robustness of 3D deep learning algo-
rithms that employ volumetric and point-cloud repre-
sentations.1
We begin by briefly covering the the pertinent back-
ground for both 3D deep learning and the robustness anal-
ysis of deep learning algorithms. Following preliminaries,
we formalize the problem of evaluating pointwise robust-
ness under adversarial occlusion. After stating the problem,
we give an algorithm that can operate in both the white-box
and black-box settings. Further, we prove that this algo-
rithm can give guarantees about the existence of adversarial
examples. Finally, we use the algorithm to attack several
state-of-the-art models in 3D deep learning.
2. Background
In this section we aim to give an overview of the field of
3D deep learning as well as the state of the art of robustness
analysis for deep learning algorithms.
2.1. 3D Deep Learning
The current renaissance of 3D deep learning methods
can be attributed to both the wide availability of cheap sen-
sors for collecting 3D data and the release of large standard
datasets of 3D objects [5, 30, 4]. Thanks to these datasets,
3D deep learning has enjoyed increased attention from ma-
chine learning practitioners. This has lead to an impres-
1Code for all experiments in this paper can be found at
https://github.com/matthewwicker/IterativeSalienceOcclusion
sive leap in performance on standard benchmarks. Much of
this progress can be attributed to novel data representation
schemes, detailed below.
Volumetric Representations One of the first meth-
ods for deep 3D shape classification called ShapeNet [30]
achieved 77% accuracy by representing data in a volumet-
ric fashion. Volumetric representation of 3D shapes in-
volves passing in a discretized 3D tensor (typically a cube),
where the value of each entry in the 3D tensor represents
the probability that an object inhabits that space. ShapeNet
was surpassed by another network utilizing a volumetric ap-
proach to shape classification named VoxNet [16], which,
utilizing computationally expensive 3D convolutions, was
able to achieve 83% classification accuracy on the Model-
Net benchmarks.
Volumetric approaches have continued to find success
outside the standard object recognition tasks and have been
used in both landing site recognition for drones [15] and in
the classification of already localized objects in 3D driving
scenes [31].
Multi-View Representations Multi-View networks take
in a full 3D model of an object and from the model generate
a series of 2D RGB images which are fed into 2D vision
algorithms in order to arrive at a classification. Multi-view
approaches in object classification [24] have remained con-
sistently state-of-the-art in terms of accuracy. However, the
use of these networks in real-time scene and object recog-
nition is non-trivial, and in some cases impossible, due to
their inherent need for full 3D information of objects for
classification.
Point-cloud representation The recent seminal work by
Qi et. al. [21] (extended in [27] and [22]) uses neural net-
works to learn a point-set function that directly takes in-
puts from sensors (point clouds) and is able to classify them
without the need for expensive operations such as conver-
sion to more inflated domains (as is the case with volu-
metric and multi-view representation schemes) or 3D con-
volutions. These networks are able to achieve similar or
better classification accuracy when compared to volumetric
approaches, and their efficiency is unmatched.
PointNets have been successful in a myriad of different
classification and segmentation tasks. Perhaps most inter-
esting for this work is their use in the recognition of ob-
jects in scenes taken from self-driving cars [20]. Previ-
ous work in point cloud recognition was completed without
deep learning in [26].
In this work we do not consider multi-view representa-
tions. Firstly, multi-view representations convert 3D data
to a collection of 2D images, thus making them compatible
with existing methods for robustness analysis of image clas-
sifiers (e.g. [19, 2, 25, 13]). Further, multi-view networks
require full 3D information about an object under consider-
ation which is rarely available when operating in a real-time
scenario. 2 The difficulty with the simultaneous analysis of
these approaches is their vastly different architectural com-
position. In order to rectify this, we will unify both ap-
proaches under the following framework (which holds true
for volumetric and order-invariant network architectures):
Data 7→ Latent Translation 7→ Pooling 7→ FCN
where FCN stands for fully connected network and refers to
a neural network with potentially several layers of neurons
which are fully connected. The specifics of this unifying
framework for 3D deep learning will be presented in detail
in Section 3 and examples of different representations [16,
21] are given in Figure 2.
2.2. Safety of Deep Learning
The phenomenon of adversarial examples has provoked
a growing concern about the safety of deep learning algo-
rithms. In general we can split methods for crafting adver-
sarial examples into classes based on the threat model (i.e.
setting of the adversary, see [18] for a thorough treatment)
and properties of the examples found.
Attacks are split into white-box algorithms and black-box
algorithms depending on what facets of the model an adver-
sary has access to. We say that an algorithm with access
to the inputs, outputs, weights and architecture of a model
is a white-box method as it can look inside of the model to
determine a best attack. A black-box attack, on the other
hand, is only able to query the model under scrutiny, or in
some extreme cases the algorithm may only have access to
input-output pairs.
Algorithms can be further decomposed based on what
kind of guarantees they are able to provide about the adver-
sarial example they craft; if an algorithm is able to guaran-
tee that it finds a minimal adversarial example or can guar-
antee that an adversarial example does not exist if it can-
not find one, then we consider it a verification algorithm,
as opposed to heuristic search algorithms which make no
guarantees about the quality or existence of any adversarial
examples that are crafted.
In our review of these methods, we seek to only give a
brief summary of pertinent works rather than providing an
exhaustive treatment of the field.
White-box Heuristic Algorithms One of the first ex-
plorations of adversarial examples was reported in [25],
which framed the discovery of adversarial examples as a
constrained optimization problem in the l2 norm. This was
followed by [8] which improved upon the L-BFGS algo-
rithm proposed in [25] and expanded the attack to the l∞
metric. The current state of the art in white-box attack meth-
ods, however, is CW-attacks [2], which uses a different op-
2Despite using the term multi-view, [3] is really referring to a fusion of
multi-modal views, not multiple unimodal views.
timization problem to generate more refined (i.e. more sim-
ilar to the original input) adversarial examples.
White-box Verification Algorithms An early attempt at
verifying neural networks uses a simplification of the clas-
sifier as a linear system and formulates the verification pro-
cedure as the potential solution to a set of linear constraints.
More recent work has expanded this approach successfully
to rectified linear units by employing an extension of the
simplex method to solve the system of equations [12]. Other
methods use different iterative refinements in order to find
adversarial examples or prove that none exist. An early at-
tempt in this vein (DLV) uses a multi-path search through
the connections of the network to exhaustively explore a re-
gion around the input through finite discretisation [11]. An-
other white-box verification approach employs global opti-
misation [23].
Black-box Algorithms One of the first black-box meth-
ods for discovering adversarial examples involved training
a surrogate model and then applying a white-box attack on
the surrogate model [18]. This approach relies on the trans-
fer of the attack from the surrogate to the real model, but
this was shown to be empirically effective. Further, itera-
tive approaches to verification of neural networks have also
been done in the black-box setting, such as [28], which uses
exhaustive input layer explorations to formulate optimal l0
attacks on images. This method was refined and improved
in [29] by exploiting Lipschitz continuity.
To the best of our knowledge, the work on robustness
of 3D deep learning pipelines has focused entirely on ran-
domized occlusion. In [21], they make a specific claim of
robustness that stems from the existence of a critical set. In
this work we will generalize the idea of a critical set to vol-
umetric networks and will reverse their claim to show that,
while in theory critical sets may offer robustness, in practice
they are actually a weak point that can be exploited. Further
discussion appears in Section 5.
3. Robustness Analysis
In this section we formalize the ideas and notation that
will allow us to analyze the robustness of 3D deep learning
pipelines.
3.1. Representations for 3D Data
We take a neural network N : X 7→ Y to be a function
with domain X and co-domain Y. An input or object is a
set of vectors x = {x0, ..., xn} where xi ∈ R3. For the
remainder of this paper, we will assume the domain to be a
set of such sets, x ∈ X ⊆ 2R3[0,1] . Moreover, we will define
Y to be the set of possible classes for each object. The out-
put of the network with respect to x is given as N(x) = y,
for some y ∈ Y. Further, we will represent the network as-
signed probability (or confidence) that x belongs to a class
y as Ny(x). Finally, we use | · | to denote the cardinality
(i.e. number of unique elements) of a set (where elements
belong to R3).
In Section 2.1, we referenced the fact that almost all deep
3D classification algorithms can be broken down into two
functions, one which translates the input to a latent repre-
sentation, and another which classifies based on that latent
representation.3 We will take the latent translation of an in-
put x to be represented by L(x) = l where l is the result of
a max pooling operation on the d-dimensional latent vector
(specifics are given below). After this latent translation, we
use y = M(l) to represent the output of the max pooled
latent vector l from an FCN M . In summary, this means we
break down the original neural network, N , into a compo-
sition of functions, M(L(x)).
PointNets As discussed in Section 2.1, PointNets are de-
signed to work on raw point cloud data. Formally, the input
to a PointNet, x, is (as in our preliminaries) a set of n points
from R3 normalized to the unit cube. One major challenge
with dealing with this kind of data is the fact that there are
n! possible orderings of a single input. As such, PointNets
must be symmetric functions (i.e. order invariant). This is
achieved using the latent translation of the data. In essence,
each component of the input, xi (a point in R3), is passed
through a series of translations to higher dimensions fol-
lowed by a convolution operation. In the original PointNet
paper, [21], each point xi ∈ R3 was translated into R64
via a CNN (convolutional neural network) and then this
64-dimensional vector was subjected to a 1D convolution
operation. A similar procedure was repeated until the net-
work arrived at n-many 1024-dimensional latent vectors, at
which point all n 1024-dimensional vectors are max pooled
into a single representative 1024-dimensional latent vector,
l. The process we just described will (as previously men-
tioned) be referred to as Lpoint : R3×n[0,1] 7→ R1024. The
original PointNet architecture is presented in Figure 2.
Volumetric Networks When compared to PointNets,
volumetric networks have a much more canonical latent
vector translation. The first step in a volumetric network,
given that the input is a set of vectors from R3, is the trans-
lation into a voxelized cube (described in Section 2.1). In
the case of VoxNet [16], the input cube x ∈ Rd×d×d[0,1] is
passed through a three-dimensional convolution operator to
produce m different filters for the cube; this is repeated a
number of times and then the resulting series of m-many
s × s × s cubes is passed into a fully connected network.
As such, we take the flattened version of them-many scaled
down cubes to be the output of the latent translationLvolum.
Of course, straightforward convolutional neural networks
are not the only kind of volumetric network that have been
studied. Many popular forms of 2D CNNs have been scaled
3Note that this is explicitly done in [21] in order to gain an order-
invariant input.
Classified as Car -
 94% Confidence
Random Sampling 
occludes 1905 
points
Misclassified as 
Sink - 21.2% 
Confidence
Iterative Sample Occlusion
only removes 26 points
Misclassified as Sofa -
32.3% Confidence 
Figure 3: A car, though initially classified correctly with
high confidence, is easily changed into being classified as
a sofa with only 26 points changed. The original input has
been marked with red points to denote all the parts of the
input that exist in the critical set.
directly up to 3D. An example of the decomposition of a
volumetric 3D pipeline can also be seen in Figure 2.
Given our decomposition of 3D deep learning pipelines
into latent translations and fully connected networks
(FCNs), it seems straightforward to simply attack the
FCN with standard robustness analysis techniques and then
project the latent vector back into the ambient space. Un-
fortunately, almost all current methods of crafting adver-
sarial examples are inappropriate for safety testing of 3D
deep learning pipelines. The most popular methods of gen-
erating adversarial examples use either the l∞ or l2 norm.
Optimization with respect to these kinds of manipulations
encourages a change in all (or almost all) of the components
of an input by some small value ±. This is inappropriate
for the volumetric representation because each component
of the input represents the probability that that component
is inhabited, and assigning every non-inhabited point in a
scene± probability of having an occupying object is unre-
alistic. Further, in the case of a point-cloud representation
scheme, using a blanket manipulation of every point in the
input (in a different direction) has the potential to take the
input outside of the natural data manifold, that is to say, that
if  is non-negligible, then we may corrupt the underlying
structure of the input that makes it recognizable to humans.
Examples of this phenomenon exist in natural images for
moderate values of  [6], and because point clouds are much
more difficult for humans to recognize without manipula-
tion, it seems that a blanket change to all points would, in
practice, render many point clouds unrecognizable to hu-
mans.
Classified as Car 
85% Confidence
Iterative Sample 
Occlusion only 
removes 56 
points
Random 
Occlusion 
removes 1385
Misclassified - 
Bathtub 28% 
Confidence
Misclassified - 
Airplane 12% 
Confidence
Figure 4: We have taken the same model as in Figure 3
and generated an adversarial example of the input with re-
spect to the VoxNet architecture. The details of the model
salience can be found in Figure 8.
Taking this as the case, we turn to l0-norm optimized at-
tack algorithms. An l0-norm attack simply optimizes for
the number of changes made to the input. We note that the
cardinality operator | · | allows a subset of the manipulations
allowed by the l0 norm. This prioritizes maintaining the
underlying structure of the point cloud while allowing for
occlusions, introduction of spurious features, and a handful
of shifts in data positions. In the next section we will de-
tail the formalization of the problem of crafting adversarial
examples with adversarial occlusion on 3D data.
3.2. Occlusion Attacks
In tasks such as 2D pedestrian recognition and facial
recognition, occlusion has been studied under several dif-
ferent models [14, 17]. Occluded inputs are valuable to
consider when evaluating the safety of a decision making
network as it is not always the case that pedestrians, ve-
hicles, or objects of interest will be in complete and plain
view. These occlusions may not always be natural, how-
ever. In fact, it is often the case that data (point clouds)
from sensors exhibit stochasticity. As such, it is imperative
to model the cases in which some parts of the data might be
missing.
Because the point-cloud and volumetric domains are less
rich than the image domain, there is no way to directly uti-
lize pre-developed models of occlusion. In lieu of this, we
simply define an occlusion of x to be some x′ ⊂ x and set
up an optimization to find the minimum occlusion defined
as:
argmin
x′⊆x
(|x| − |x′|) s.t. N(x′) 6= N(x) (1)
Of course, where we have an n point input there are
2n − 1 possible occlusions that could possibly satisfy this
objective. In order to cut down this search space we will use
the notion of a latent translation to define a critical point set,
Cxn (abbrev. Cn), which is a concept introduced in [21]. We
again distinguish our use of the critical set by noting that in
this work we generalize it to volumetric networks and use it
explicitly to display model weakness rather than to hypoth-
esize robustness:
Cxn = {xi ∈ x | L(x/xi) 6= L(x)} (2)
where we define x/xi to be the values of x that do not in-
clude xi. That is, a value exists in the critical point set
if and only if its removal from the input impacts the la-
tent representation of the input. For Lpoint we know that
xi ∈ Cxn if ∀i 6= j, li ≥ lj by virtue of the max pool-
ing layer. Further, we know that for Lvolum, xi ∈ Cxn if
∀lj ∈ η(li), α(li) ≥ α(lj) where α(li) represents the ac-
tivation value of the xthi input voxel after convolution
4 and
η(xi) represents the pooling neighborhood of the last layer
of the latent translation prior to the flattening and fully-
connected network.
Both of these formulations require us to use the vector
l which implies that the method needs white-box access to
the network in order to find adversarial examples; however,
we will later prove that, by exploiting our knowledge of 3D
deep learning approaches, our attack algorithm can indeed
work in the black-box setting.
Iterative Salience Occlusion Given the above ability to
calculate the critical point set, we propose the following
simple algorithm to randomly explore and iteratively refine
an occlusion attack.
Algorithm 1 Iterative Salience Occlusion
1: procedure ISO(N, y, x, g)
2: x′ ← x
3: while g(N, y, x, x′) do
4: Cn ←CalcCn(N, x′)
5: Cn ←Rank(Cn)
6: for xi ∈ Cn do
7: if (N(x′) 6= y)
8: break
9: if(Ny(x′/xi) ≤ Ny(x′))
10: x′ ← x′/xi
11: for xi ∈ x− x′ do
12: if(N(x′ ∪ xi) 6= y)
13: x′ ← x′ ∪ xi
14: if(N(x′) 6= y and g(N, y, x, x′) 6= true)
15: x′ ← x
16: return x′
Within the ISO algorithm we take the Rank function to
4Note that multiple xi’s will map to the same α(xi) as a result of the
down-sampling associated with the convolution operator.
be some way of computing and ordering the critical point
set based on the saliency and assume that Rank never re-
turns the same permutation twice until it has exhausted all
other options. All operations within the algorithm use stan-
dard set-theoretic notation.
Our algorithm has several properties that make it ideal as
a method for evaluating worst-case occlusion. Firstly, the
algorithm is anytime, meaning that the algorithm can ter-
minate given any user defined termination condition, which
we encode as a boolean function g, an input to the algo-
rithm. The function g can encode adversarial goals includ-
ing confidence reduction (Ny(x) − Ny(x′) > k), crafting
adversarial examples (N(x) 6= N(x′)), or crafting targeted
adversarial examples (N(x′) = y′). One may also change
the algorithm slightly so that it returns the best adversarial
example it has found in a specified amount of time.
In addition to being anytime, we can show that, in the
case of PointNet architectures, this algorithm (which is cur-
rently white-box) can operate in the black-box setting.
Theorem 1. Given an input x and a PointNet network N ,
we can compute the critical set Cn in a black-box setting,
given that all weights in M are non-zero.
Proof. For each xi ∈ x we can determine if it exists in the
critical set by removing xi from x and checking the final
output of the network. If xi ∈ Cn, then, by definition, the
output will change due to the elimination of its contribution
to l. If xi 6∈ Cn then the output will not change because l
will not change.
Finally, this algorithm has the strength of being a verifi-
cation approach, meaning that it provides guarantees about
both (1) finding an adversarial example if one exists and (2)
finding an adversarial example that satisfies Equation 1 if
one exists. Below we show that, if we set g such that it re-
turns true if and only if all possible Cs permutations have
been checked, then Equation 1 must be satisfied.
Theorem 2. Given an input x ∈ 2R3[0,1] and a neural net-
work N that satisfies our framework, we can show that the
ISO algorithm will find the optimal adversarial example
that satisfies Eq. 1.
Proof. First, if there exists s ⊆ x that is an adversarial ex-
ample, we must find it by exhaustive search. This is because
the Rank function will allow us to check all possible manip-
ulation orders of the critical set and we set the g function
such that the algorithm will not terminate until this is the
case. Next, we know that for each manipulation order that
is checked we must yield the smallest possible subset for
that order because of the iterative refinement on lines 11-
13 of the algorithm (any points unnecessarily removed will
be added back in). This means that if an adversarial exam-
ple exists we will find it, and any example we find must be
minimal.
4. Evaluation
Given the strengths of the ISO algorithm, we will use it
to show that, in almost all cases, random occlusion vastly
overestimates the robustness of 3D deep learning pipelines.
This discovery exacerbates the need for further study in
the development of robust 3D deep learning algorithms and
methods to check their safety.
In order to study the effectiveness of the proposed algo-
rithm on both point-cloud and volumetric representations,
we retrained both the VoxNet [16] and PointNet [21] net-
work architectures on the ModelNet10 and ModelNet40
benchmarks [30] as well as on 3D objects extracted from
the LIDAR sensor of the KITTI self-driving car [7] (see
Appendix). In all cases, the networks were trained for 50
epochs according to the training details provided in the re-
spective papers. Using the pre-defined test-train split from
ModelNet, all trained networks achieved accuracy within
4% of the reported accuracy on the test set.
After training each network, we sampled 200 objects
from the test set in order to evaluate the robustness of each
model. In the case of ModelNet10, the networks were tested
with a time cutoff of 2 seconds to find an adversarial exam-
ple, and in the case of ModelNet40 the ISO algorithm was
given a 5 second cutoff. On the other hand, the random oc-
clusion algorithm was simply given a random permutation
of the data and removed the data in that random order until a
misclassification was found, at which point it would report
the number of points it needed to remove. As we can see
in Figures 6.a and 7.a, the results reported by the random
occlusion match up very well with those that are reported
in [21]. Over the set of 200 objects we track how the accu-
racy of the network changes as we occlude more points from
each model. In the worst case, VoxNet trained on Model-
Net40, it took only the occlusion of 6.5% of the input in
order to reduce the network to 0% classification accuracy.
A more readily interpretable version of Figures 6 and 7
exists in Table 1. We see that, in general, using random
occlusion instead of the ISO algorithm overestimates ro-
bustness of the network to occlusion by around 60%. Fur-
ther, we see that each of the models was reduced to less
that 10% classification accuracy providing that the ISO al-
gorithm was given time to manipulate half of the data.
5. Discussion
From our theoretical analysis it seems that one of the key
components in accurately analyzing a 3D deep learning ar-
chitecture is the cardinality of the critical point set. On one
hand, it may seem desirable to have a network with a low
critical set cardinality, that is to say, a network that only
looks at several key points of the input in order to make a
decision. It is clear that there exists a relationship between
the number of points in the critical set and the effectiveness
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Distributions of critical set cardinalites for Point-
Net trained on ModelNet10 and ModelNet40. These distri-
butions were obtained by the calculation of critical point set
cardinalites on 1000 test set models.
Figure 6: PointNet robustness on ModelNet10 (b) and Mod-
elNet40 (a). Blue plots the change in accuracy due to ran-
dom occlusion whilst red is the change in accuracy due to
ISO occlusion. In (a), we have also pulled values from the
identical random occlusion test performed in [21].
of a random occlusion approach. For example, the probabil-
ity that a random network will select a point that matters to
the classification of any given input point cloud is precisely
equal to the cardinality of the critical set divided by the car-
dinality of the unique points in the input. On the other hand,
it seems that a low critical point set cardinality will lead di-
rectly to the success of the proposed ISO algorithm as it
only manipulates points that exist in the critical set.
PointNet In Figure 5 we see that the the cardinality of
the critical set on ModelNet inputs with 2048 points hovers
around 450 to 500 points, roughly a quarter of the data.
Given that the average critical point set cardinality is
about 25% of the input model, we would like to highlight
the performance of the ISO algorithm after removal of 25%
of the data. The reason that the network does not immedi-
ately collapse to 0% classification accuracy is that, after a
point is removed from the critical point set, there is an open-
ing for a new point to become critical. Despite this compli-
cation, our simple algorithm allows us to get an exponential
decrease in accuracy with an increase in occlusion, as seen
in plots in Figures 6 and 7. Ultimately, this increases our
confidence in the link between the modifications of the crit-
ical point set and the network’s overall robustness.
VoxNet While defining the critical set for PointNet
is straightforward, VoxNet (and volumetric approaches in
Architecture Dataset Method 0% Occl. 25% Occl. 50% Occl. 75% Occl. 95% Occl.
VoxNet
ModelNet10
Rand. 79.8% 72.1% 66.9% 51.9% 10.9%
ISO 79.8% 1.0% 0% 0% 0%
ModelNet40
Rand. 76.1% 60.9% 39.1% 12.3% 2.0%
ISO 76.1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
KITTI
Rand. 71.5% 55.5% 30.0% 13.5% 6.5%
ISO 71.5% 0% 0% 0% 0%
PointNet
ModelNet10
Rand. 86.1% 84.0% 83.0% 79.2% 60.2%
ISO 86.1% 27% 5% 0% 0%
ModelNet40
Rand. 82.5% 79.4% 78.2% 74.3% 35.9%
ISO 82.5% 17.9% 4.1% 0% 0%
KITTI
Rand. 73.0% 72.5% 72.0% 68.5% 40.5%
ISO 73.0% 49.5% 37.5% 0% 0%
Table 1: Reduction in classification accuracy for different levels of both random and iterative saliency occlusion for all tested
datasets (ModelNet10, ModelNet40 and KITTI).
Figure 7: Figure follows the same format as Figure 6.
VoxNet robustness on ModelNet10 (b) and ModelNet40 (a).
On the ModelNet40 benchmark, it takes roughly 6.5% oc-
clusion to reduce the network performance to 0%.
general) pose a more difficult problem. Unlike PointNet,
where membership in the critical set is binary, convolutional
volumetric networks yield continuous salience values. This
means that every point in the input exists in the critical set.
To rectify this, we set a threshold that determines which
points are critical or not. In order to be consistent with the
analysis for PointNet, we have set the threshold for mem-
bership of the critical set to be the most salient 25% of the
input. This is visualized in Figure 8; however, when we
look at the 25% occluded point in Table 1, we see that we
can force almost all examples to be misclassified.
Future Directions One aim of the approach presented
in this paper is to introduce and encourage the use of alter-
nate metrics for accuracy when evaluating 3D deep learning
pipelines that may come into use in real-time, safety-critical
scenarios. The methods of computing saliency that are for-
mulated in this work can be directly utilized in the frame-
works of [28, 29, 1] in order to derive bounds on the safety
of classification. The improvement of generalization of 3D
deep learning would be aided greatly by formulating more
robust pipelines for processing point-cloud data.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 8: For voxelized inputs, (a), we calculate the saliency
as described in Section 3.1. We normalize the latent
saliency of the points into a salience distribution. The dif-
ferent quartiles (q1 - yellow line, q3 - red line in (b)) give us
an idea of relative saliency; in (c) we map each point in the
input to its saliency where green represents the least salient
and red the most salient. The critical set is then considered
to be any points that fall in the upper 25% of all computed
saliency values, this has been visualized in (d).
6. Conclusion
In this work, we demonstrate that the critical point sets
induced by the latent space translation in 3D deep learning
pipelines, for both point-cloud and volumetric representa-
tions, expose a vulnerability to adversarial occlusion attacks
that to this point had not been studied. We show that, in
the worst case, a black-box verification approach can, using
only 4 seconds per input example, reduce the accuracy of
a network to 0% despite manipulating at most 6.5% of the
input.
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A. Further KITTI Evaluation
The KITTI Dataset [7] is a collection of sensor readings from
an autonomous vehicle in an urban environment. This includes
point clouds from a Velodyne sensor that have been hand labeled
with 3D bounding boxes. To assess classification networks on this
data, we isolated all of the objects in each driving scene and cre-
ated a classification task (determining if an object was a car, truck
or other) comprised of 5,000 real-world point clouds. In order to
extract these objects we parsed through driving sequences and iso-
lated the point clouds from human-labeled bounding boxes that
had sufficient density (i.e. easily recognizable objects).
In Table 2 we show the initial accuracy of each method on the
new data set in the first column. In subseqent columns we show
how data occlusion affects the performance of the network (identi-
cal to the rows in the main paper). This is done for both white-box
and black-box settings. The times reported are the mean times in
seconds between the initial classification and the final adversar-
ial example being returned. These times only reflect inputs which
were initially classified correctly by the network.
Architecture 0% Occl. 25% 50% 75% time (s)
PointNet 73% 49.5% 37.5% 0% 5.06
PointNet-BB 73% 49.5% 37.5% 0% 24.28
PointNet-Rand 73% 72.5% 72.0% 68.5% 3.54
VoxNet 71.5% 0% 0% 0% 1.16
VoxNet-BB 71.5% 0% 0% 0% 1.44
VoxNet-Rand 71.5% 55.5% 30.0% 13.5% 0.45
Table 2: Extension of Table 1 for KITTI setting only. ‘0%
Occl.’ denotes initial accuracy. Percentages represent the
amount of data occluded. Rows marked BB are for the ISO
algorithm operating in a black-box setting.
